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In this thesis, I introduce a philosophic concept termed “imaginative resistance,” a 
concept which targets the unimaginability of narratives, which I argue offers new insights 
into polarized communication.  I discuss the philosophic debate on imaginative resistance 
to date, and piece out central puzzles and approaches.  I show that imaginative resistance 
can be applied to broader types of communication than those currently being discussed 
by philosophers, and indicate that polarized debates are especially likely places to 
uncover imaginative resistance.  I discuss, and respond to, a recent article by Susan M. 
Behuniak (2011) in which she analyzes a subsection of the contemporary medical 
euthanasia debate and concludes that with mutual understanding of the word “dignity” 
the sides should be able to communicate better.  I then do my own analysis, focusing 
particularly on the perspective of the disability rights advocacy group involved in 
Behuniak’s analysis, Not Dead Yet, and I analyze key texts from this group using the 
theory of imaginative resistance.  My analysis reveals that beneath their rhetoric is a 
particular worldview and set of fears which provoke a refusal or inability to imagine that 




correct, therefore inhibiting their ability to engage with Compassion & Choices).  I show 
that understanding this worldview and set of fears is essential to understanding their 
rhetorical choices, and that if effective debate requires understanding then the barriers 
present to effective debate are considerably more substantial than the use or interpretation 
of the word “dignity.”  I also suggest other debates in which this theory may prove useful, 









CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The current rhetorical climate in the United States reflects increasing polarization of 
viewpoints, including, and possibly rooted in, political polarization.  According to the 
Pew Research Center, political polarization has increased dramatically along a variety of 
indicators in the past two decades, resulting in 70% of Democrats and Republicans who 
are highly involved with politics aligning ideologically with their party, which more than 
doubles the number of two decades prior (Doherty, 2014).  Along with this, there has 
been dramatically increased animosity between the parties and a refusal to compromise 
on equal terms (Doherty, 2014). 
 Disagreements regarding the levels, extents, and types of this polarization 
continue in academic circles (Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope, 2011; McCarty, Poole, & 
Rosenthall, 2006; Prior, 2007; Warner & McKinney, 2013; Iyengar et al., 2012), though 
the over-arching picture is becoming much clearer.  Values and strongly voiced beliefs by 
those on the right and left are becoming more pronounced; those on either side share 
fewer values with the other side than in the past, and even those who express values from 
both sides of the American political spectrum tend to feel more anger and animosity 
toward those who disagree than one might previously have expected from a moderate 




 The rhetorical strategy sometimes called polarization, which crystalizes enemies, 
may be partially to blame (Harpine, 2009); however, it is not the cause of polarization nor 
this rhetorical strategy with which I engage in this paper.  Instead, I engage with the state 
of being polarized, what this state entails, and the rhetorical obstacles polarization creates, 
as can be illuminated by a theory often referred to as “imaginative resistance.” 
 For the purposes of this thesis, I define polarization as a state in which sharp 
divergences in ideology or worldview which are rooted in different conceptions of values, 
priorities, and reality result in hostility toward, or an inability to understand, the 
perspectives on the other side of the disagreement.  In essence, when two polarized sides 
try to engage in a debate, they experience enormous obstacles to understanding each 
other, obstacles which may be so severe as to drive an observer to say that they cannot 
understand each other.  Polarization, then, is a serious problem, as lack of understanding 
precludes meaningful debate.  As the foundational new rhetorician I. A. Richards stated, 
“[T]he chief lesson to be learnt…is the futility of all argumentation that precedes 
understanding.  We cannot profitably attack any opinion until we have discovered what it 
expresses as well as what it states…” (Richards, 1991, p. 28).  I will return to this passage 
and its significance in what follows.  For now, it is important to note that the focus of this 
thesis is to propose a new way to foster understanding in polarized debates. 
 I propose that a philosophic concept can help us understand the aspects of 
polarization which relate to a deepening inability or unwillingness to engage with 
narratives that directly contradict or are believed to be opposed to one’s deeply held 
narratives of value or sense of reality.  This philosophic concept is often called 




applied to works of fiction.  In this thesis, I argue that imaginative resistance illuminates 
several important dimensions of polarization in real-world communication, thereby 
allowing us to consider these kinds of conflict in a different light: the light of 
unimaginable narratives. 
 According to contemporary philosophers, imaginative resistance is, roughly, the 
refusal or inability to fully engage with a work of fiction due to propositions that the 
reader does not believe could be true in the fictional world.  As I discuss this theory, I am 
engaging in a discussion that centers around philosopher and cognitive scientist Tamar 
Szabó Gendler and philosophers Kendall Walton and Brian Weatherson.  I draw on these 
discussions as well as traditions of rhetoric and a contemporary polarized debate to show 
that this theory has strong potential for application in communication. 
 To explore the value of the theory of imaginative resistance for application to 
communication,  I use the theory in this work to analyze a subsection of the medical 
euthanasia debate: the debate between disability rights activists and right to die advocates 
over the question of whether disabled and terminally ill patients should be allowed to end 
their lives via what is sometimes (contentiously) called “medically assisted suicide.”  
Briefly, right to die activists claim that the right to choose the time and manner of one’s 
death is a human right, while disability activists contend that any such practice results in 
pressure upon the disabled to end their lives.  
 One key feature of this debate has been the way each side has used the concept 
“dignity.”  Right to die activists have insisted upon the right to a “death with dignity,” 
while disability rights activists have argued that pressure to end the lives of the ill and 




 My discussion focuses on a study of this concept of dignity in this debate by 
Susan M. Behuniak, “Death with ‘dignity’: The wedge that divides the disability rights 
movement from the right to die movement.”  I discuss Behuniak’s analysis and her 
findings.  I then argue that her analysis, while insightful, misses a key underlying point, 
which the theory of imaginative resistance elucidates.  Behuniak’s idea is that the 
disagreement between the two groups may be fruitfully understood by analyzing the way 
each sides uses the term “dignity.”  She uses this term as a wedge into the worldviews of 
the two sides.  My response is to argue that, on the contrary, without a prior 
understanding of the worldviews or perspectives of the two sides of the debate, it is easy 
to misunderstand the way each side is using the term “dignity.”  The key issue in 
miscommunication between the two sides is much deeper than what appears on the 
surface to be two different concepts of “dignity.”  It is, actually, an issue of differing—
and incompatible—conceptions of reality.  These conceptions of reality, and the place 
that dignity—the concept, not the term—holds in each of them, must be grasped before 
the way the term “dignity” is used by each side can be understood.  
 To put it simply, Behuniak argues that an analysis of the rhetorical use of specific 
terms can help us to understand the worldviews of opposing sides. I, on the other hand, 
argue that only by understanding the worldviews of opposing sides may we correctly 
analyze each sides’ rhetorical use of terms. Because each side of the debate can (more or 
less literally) not even imagine the worldview that the other side takes for granted, each 
side inevitably mistakes what the other side means by “dignity.” Attempts by each side to 




right way to protect the “dignity” of the disabled and dying can therefore be met with 
only incomprehension, misunderstanding, anger, and rejection. 
 I make two major claims in this thesis: 
 
(I) Imaginative resistance is a broader phenomenon than has been 
noted by philosophers to date, a phenomenon which does not 
simply encompass responses to fictional narratives but real-world 
narratives as well. 
 
(II) Imaginative resistance to real-world narratives sheds light on 
the deep miscommunications involved in polarized communication, 
and, as such, this phenomenon has serious implications for the 
study of communication in a variety of areas. 
 
 I argue both of these claims in multiple parts of this thesis.  In Chapter 2, I ground 
my discussion in the contemporary medical euthanasia debate.  After briefly discussing 
the debate as a whole, I discuss and analyze Behuniak’s analysis of two groups which 
operate from the perspectives of the right to die and disability studies, and begin to set the 
stage for re-analyzing these groups for unimaginable narratives and contested realities.  
In Chapter 3, I switch gears to explaining the theory of imaginative resistance as being 
discussed by philosophers, as I begin to set the stage for re-analyzing Behuniak’s sources.  
In Chapter 4, I highlight essential features of imaginative resistance which are essential to 




looks like in communication.  In Chapter 5, I return to Behuniak’s analysis, and do my 
own analysis of the two sides of the medical euthanasia debate which she analyzed, this 
time using the theory of imaginative resistance to guide my analysis in order to find much 
deeper obstacles for communication than those Behuniak observed.  Finally, in Chapter 6, 
I state my conclusions, discuss how imaginative resistance adds to the concept of 
incommensurability, and propose future directions for the exploration and application of 







CHAPTER 2.  THE MEDICAL EUTHANASIA DEBATE AND BEHUNIAK’S 
ANALYSIS OF “DIGNITY” 
2.1 The Medical Euthanasia Debate: A Brief Overview 
Medical euthanasia, sometimes referred to as “physician assisted suicide” or “physician 
assisted death,” is the practice by which a physician or other health professional uses her 
position to bring about the death of a patient, usually to address the suffering of a 
terminally ill patient.  The question of whether medical euthanasia should be permitted in 
any form, and if so, in which forms, has become increasingly important as our medical 
technology continues to increase our lifespan while, at times, being unable to relieve our 
suffering or allow patients to continue living a life they find to be “dignified” or 
“valuable” (Hyde, 2001; Behuniak, 2011). 
 Medical euthanasia is a debate which elicits strong emotions from those involved.  
Perhaps these strong emotions stem from experiences with the suffering of loved ones, 
the knowledge that all of us are likely to eventually face these issues as patients or loved 
ones of patients, and perhaps because of strong feelings, generally, about the sanctity of 
life, the horrors of suffering, or the grief of those left behind when someone dies by 
whatever means (Hyde, 2001; Behuniak, 2011; Dolmage, 2014). 
 This impassioned debate is often framed as having two primary sides: (1) the 
conservative rejection of medical euthanasia as “murder,” “suicide,” or a betrayal of the 




entreaty that people have the “right to die” rather than suffer the pain, anguish, and 
“indignities” of a medically prolonged life (Behuniak, 2011; Hyde, 2001). 
 There are other major divides in this debate, however.  One is the divide between 
those advocating for different permissible and impermissible types of medical euthanasia, 
a debate which usually emphasizes two sides: active and passive euthanasia (James, 2005; 
Hyde, 2001).  Passive euthanasia is the withholding of medical treatment, thereby 
allowing the patient to die of natural causes.  Active euthanasia is the hastening of the 
patient’s death, often with the administering of a lethal dose of medicine such as 
potassium chloride (Hyde, 2001).  Passive euthanasia is currently permitted and practiced 
widely under strict conditions of consent, but some argue that the difference between 
passive and active euthanasia is negligible; if you allow one, you should allow the other 
out of compassion for the slowly-dying (James, 2005; Hyde, 2001).  A middle ground 
often championed by those who oppose active euthanasia (Not Dead Yet, 2015; Brown, 
2015, February 5), which is meant to be more passive than active and is currently legal in 
the United States as well, is the act of putting a patient into a medically-induced coma 
and withholding nutrients and treatments until the patient dies, though this approach is 
sometimes seen as particularly cruel and hard for the family of the dying patient to 
withstand due to the waiting and the wasting effects on the patient (Behuniak, 2011; 
Hyde, 2001). 
 Another major divide in the medical euthanasia debate is far less frequently 
discussed.  This is the divide between progressives, some of whom align themselves with 
a “right to die” perspective, and others, disability rights activists, who condemn medical 




with disabilities.  It is this division which becomes the focus of Behuniak’s (2011) 
analysis as well as my own. 
 
2.1.1 Behuniak’s Methods 
Behuniak (2011) notices that right to die activists and disability activists seem to be using 
a single word with high frequency but with differing meaning.  The word is “dignity.”  In 
order to explore the specifics of this term’s usage in different camps, Behuniak selects 
two activism organizations whose rhetoric she analyzes: one from the right to die 
perspective, called Compassion & Choices, and another from the disability rights 
perspective, called Not Dead Yet.  Drawing upon Deborah Stone (2002) and Rochefort 
and Cobb (1994), Behuniak argues that “dignity” has a “problem definition,” which 
means that different sides of the debate define the term differently.  She argues that this, 
then, creates significant obstacles to policy discussion and agreement.  Behuniak analyzes 
pamphlets and, in particular, websites and legal advocacy, and compares and contrasts 
the two groups’ uses of the word “dignity” to uncover differences in intended meaning.  
Crucially, Behuniak argues that these differing definitions of the term “dignity” provide 
insight into the two groups’ central concerns as political activists. 
 To understand the conceptualizations of “dignity” used by Compassion & Choices 
and Not Dead Yet, Behuniak draws upon philosophical and medical definitions and 
explorations of the term “dignity,” especially as they relate to the topics of death and 





(1) Is dignity “something inherent, bestowed, or something people 
earn” (p. 21)? 
(2) Is dignity essentially an ability to exercise “autonomy”? 
(3) Is there a difference between “pain relief” and “putting an end 
to suffering” (p. 21)? 
(4) Is dignity a characteristic of death or only of life? 
(5) Is dignity a value which should be upheld or a status which 
requires prescribed actions? 
 
 Let’s take a moment to consider these five questions.  First, one can imagine that 
it makes a considerable difference whether an individual means to be expressing that 
dignity is inherent versus earned.  If dignity is inherent, then to obstruct someone’s 
dignity may be understood to be a violation, or it may be that you cannot disrupt dignity, 
no matter what you do.  If dignity is earned, then the questions become “how?”, “to what 
effect?”, and “what obligation, if any, do others have to make the earning of dignity 
possible, easier, or more restricted?”  However, for Behuniak, these consequences and 
others of the terms are not of the utmost importance; her analysis is one which is focused 
on understanding the meaning intended by each party when they use the term “dignity.” 
 Behuniak emphasizes that this definitional question can be understood as a 
“spectrum” with two extremes.  On one extreme, she says, sits the philosopher Immanuel 
Kant, “who maintained that dignity is an unconditional attribute of human beings as 
rational creatures” (Behuniak, 2011, p. 21), an attribute which can be neither gained nor 




that dignity is a moral creation, bestowed by the community, and so is not an attribute 
inherently possessed by any person” (Behuniak, 2011, p. 21).  Again, Behuniak does not 
explore the ramifications of these sides, but only notes these differences to emphasize 
that conceptual disagreements exist about the term “dignity.” 
 The second question Behuniak considers is a disagreement about “[t]he exact 
nature of dignity” (2011, p. 21).  She points to the use of the word “autonomy” as “the 
most frequently used synonym used to explain ‘dignity’” (Behuniak, 2011, p. 21).  
Drawing upon the works of Lois Shepherd (1998), Behuniak notes that there is little 
disagreement about the definition of “autonomy” in relation to medical euthanasia: 
autonomy “refers to a personal right over decisions affecting one’s own life” (p. 21).  She 
further engages with Shepherd’s work to note that the term seems to have been 
appropriated from the abortion debate to mean the equivalent of “choice,” which some 
regard as a mistake.  She does not explain why, though, or what effect these uses may 
have. 
 In regards to her third question, whether there is a difference between dignity as 
“pain relief” and dignity as “putting an end to suffering” (Behuniak, 2011, p. 21), 
Behuniak emphasizes the difference between the purely physical “pain” and the broadly 
encompassing “suffering” which includes distress ranging from physical to spiritual and 
relational.  She further notes that sometimes these terms are used interchangeably, 
without precision. 
 Her fourth question emphasizes the dilemma of whether there even can be dignity 
in death and dying, or whether dignity is a characteristic purely of life and living.  




about the phrase “death with dignity,” and whether it is possible to die with dignity at all.  
Exactly how this question relates to conceptualizations of “dignity” by the two groups in 
question is unclear. 
 Behuniak’s fifth question relates to whether “dignity can be objective or 
subjective” (Behuniak, 2011, p. 22).  Behuniak notes here that it may not be possible to 
give dignity, but it may be possible to try to “prevent indignities” through prescribed 
actions which “better attend to the individual patient” (p. 22). 
 These questions present the complexity of the term “dignity” and set the stage for 
the most important definitional distinction in her analysis, which is the distinction 
between what she calls “basic”—or “Kantian”—dignity on the one hand, and “personal” 
dignity, on the other.  Basic or Kantian dignity refers to “inherent and inalienable 
universal value for individuals” (Behuniak, 2011, p. 22).  To elaborate and clarify, 
Immanuel Kant claimed that respect is owed to all people just because they are people 
(i.e., free, rational beings, a definition which may pose some obstacles, but need not be a 
focus of this analysis) (Dillon, 2014).  The idea is that all people are deserving of respect.  
To respect a person, in the Kantian sense, is to acknowledge that a person must be treated 
as an end in him or herself rather than merely as a means to an end (Dillon, 2014).  
Another way of putting this—outlined by Daryl Pullman (2002) and employed by 
Behuniak—is to say that “basic dignity” is respect for personhood.  Pullman and 
Behuniak both note that some in the medical euthanasia debate regard basic dignity as 
inalienable, while others claim that it can be—and too often is—stripped away during the 




 The second type of dignity, which contrasts with basic dignity, is referred to as 
“personal dignity” (Pullman, 2002; Behuniak, 2011).  Personal dignity is rather like 
“decorum”; it is the sense of “dignity” that is generally meant when one says that a 
person has “suffered an indignity” or when a slighted person says “allow me my dignity.”  
Personal dignity, according to Pullman, is a concept “more particular, individualistic, and 
transient in nature” (p. 76) than basic dignity.  Personal dignity aligns with individual 
preferences, the idea of the beautiful life, and personal goals (Pullman, 2002; Behuniak, 
2011).  When one says that a disabled a person has “lost some dignity” because he needs 
assistance in bathing or using the bathroom, for example, the kind of dignity in question 
is personal dignity.  
 Once this key difference between basic and personal dignity is established, 
Behuniak examines uses of the term “dignity” by the two activist organizations, 
Compassion & Choices and Not Dead Yet.  She argues that these uses show that each 
side uses the term “dignity” to refer to different conceptualizations of dignity. 
 
2.1.1.1 Behuniak’s Findings 
Behuniak analyzes the rhetorical choices of Compassion & Choices and Not Dead Yet, 
and concludes that they are using the term “dignity” in different ways.  According to her 
analysis, Compassion & Choices intends to refer to personal dignity, while Not Dead Yet 
intends to refer to basic dignity (Behuniak, 2011). 
 Behuniak notes that Compassion & Choices, the group that advocates for the right 




with three overarching themes: “bans on physical assisted death force terminally ill 
people to endure pain and suffering,” “the terminally ill are denied their legal rights to 
privacy, liberty, and personal autonomy” and the bans “impose indignities on the dying” 
which become obstacles to “achieving a ‘good death’” (2011, p. 24).  Further emphasis is 
placed by Compassion & Choices on individuals being able to define for themselves what 
a “good death” is and how much is too much pain and suffering.  By analyzing pamphlets, 
legal briefs, and other materials, Behuniak provides a consistent picture of Compassion & 
Choices’ messages, and concludes that they are consistently referring to personal dignity 
and that, therefore, personal dignity, not basic dignity, is their focus.   
Behuniak writes that the use of personal dignity rhetoric by Compassion and 
Choices suggests a particular worldview.  According to this worldview, “It is important to 
control one’s own death and implement one’s own vision of a good death; taking action 
in response to pain and suffering is an ethical act; and human rights must be recognized 
as including a right to control and determine the manner and time of one’s own death” 
(2011, p. 24). 
 In contrast, Behuniak’s analysis of Not Dead Yet, the disability rights group, 
provides a picture of a group concerned with the right to be respected and allowed to 
live—even when society in its fear of different bodies would believe that people with 
disabilities might prefer to die (2011).  Not Dead Yet takes issue with rhetoric which 
suggests or outright states that it is “an indignity for a person to become dependent” 
(Behuniak, 2011, p. 23).  And, furthermore, there are concerns that the idea of being able 




to receive or afford the treatment and care they need in a system without universal 
healthcare and which discriminates against people with disabilities (Behuniak, 2011). 
 Behuniak parses these arguments from Not Dead Yet into three strands.  First, 
there is a “deadly double standard” which legally protects those who do not have 
disabilities from suicidal behavior, but encourages and permits suicidal behavior in those 
with disabilities, including the terminally ill (Not Dead Yet, 2011, as cited in Behuniak, 
2011).  Quoting Clair Lewis (2010), Behuniak summarizes the first strand of argument as 
follows, “It seems that disabled people are the only people who can be suicidal and 
mentally competent at the same time” (p. 26). 
 Second, Not Dead Yet points out that, legally, people with disabilities are not 
protected as a “suspect class,” as racial or ethnic minorities are.  Being classified as a 
“suspect class” acknowledges the dangers of discrimination against a particular group in 
our culture, and grants potentially life-saving protection from that discrimination 
(Behuniak, 2011).  Not being included as a suspect class means that people with 
disabilities are not afforded this protection, or this serious, legal acknowledgement of the 
risk that prejudice may influence decisions regarding their wellbeing and even survival. 
 Third, Not Dead Yet challenges people to see that choice in dying should be 
allowed for all or restricted to all, equally, disabled or not, terminally ill or not, if the 
central issue is, indeed, choice, rather than discrimination.  In other words, the argument 
is that medical euthanasia should be an option freely given to anyone in any circumstance, 
or it should not be given to anyone in any circumstance.  Restricting medical euthanasia 
to those with disabilities or terminal diseases (Not Dead Yet views terminal illness as a 




as valuable as the life of a non-disabled person, and, in fact, the law may be stating that 
the life has no value at all (Behuniak, 2011). 
 It is clear, here, that Not Dead Yet is using dignity rhetoric which evokes, 
primarily, concerns of basic dignity.  The issue here is whether governments, legal 
systems, physicians, and people on the street are recognizing that people with disabilities 
should be regarded as having full-blown personhood at all.  If they deserve to be regarded 
with respect, as having inalienable basic dignity, then people with disabilities (including 
the terminally ill) should not be allowed, as a special case, to commit suicide, whether 
aided or unaided.  Only through the idea that people with disabilities are lesser and 
undignified in their very existence can we institute laws which make it legal for such 
people to kill themselves or receive aid in doing so while not permitting this devil’s 
bargain, “autonomy,” to all people (Behuniak, 2011).  In other words, Not Dead Yet is 
using stark basic dignity rhetoric, charging others in the debate and the broader culture of 
lethally failing to recognize the basic personhood of people with disabilities. 
 
2.1.1.1.1 Why Both Groups Are Concerned with Basic Dignity 
Behuniak claims that the rhetorical choices of these two groups—exemplified in the way 
they use the term “dignity” and the arguments they present using it—give us insight into 
the two groups’ worldviews.  However, by using an investigation of the term “dignity” to 
arrive at an understanding of each group’s worldview, Behuniak misses the key point that 
each group is fighting a different kind of public battle which may be affecting their 




from term to worldview rather than the other way around, Behuniak is misconstruing 
purposeful political rhetoric for core organizational values. 
 I explore these issues in detail in Chapter 5, but I would like to introduce the key 
ideas here. First, Compassion & Choices and Not Dead Yet occupy very different spheres 
of power.  Not Dead Yet is representing a minority group which experiences pervasive 
discrimination, discrimination which focuses on the devaluing of the personhood of the 
person who has a disability.  One would expect a group facing these challenges to their 
basic dignity to use rhetoric which specifically addresses this issue.  Compassion & 
Choices occupies a relatively privileged position, because they seek to represent those 
who do not disagree, necessarily, with the pervasive discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities.  Instead, they wish to challenge the Hippocratic Oath and its service to 
individuals during the dying process.  In a country which has a large and powerful 
political party which emphasizes in a great array of policy stances a dedication to choice 
and self-determination, this perspective is best stated through rhetoric of freedom and 
autonomy, in other words, rhetoric which aligns with issues of personal dignity. 
 Is the underlying concern which Compassion & Choices has one of personal 
dignity?  I argue that it is not.  Behuniak so quickly defines basic and personal dignity 
that she forgets that a respect for the individual interests of a person is built into basic 
dignity, at least if we are to understand basic dignity as Kantian dignity.  Regarding 
others as “an end in themselves” rather than just a “means to an end,” as Kant so 
frequently puts it, requires seeing past the way one would prefer to regard a person and 
the goals which one has, including upholding the Hippocratic Oath, to the needs, interests, 




Hippocratic Oath or safeguarding the religiously understood sanctity of life against the 
will of the terminally ill person may be understood to be using a person as a mere means 
to an end, with the end being the upholding of your own values and interests.  To put that 
differently, respecting the basic dignity of a person may mean, under some circumstances, 
respecting her personhood more than her life.  To force a rational person to continue 
living beyond her wish to live is to subordinate her personhood to her mere biological life.  
It may be to treat her personhood as a means to an end—her life.  This is a violation of 
basic dignity.  
 The battle, here, is for the basic dignity of all persons.  On one side, Compassion 
and Choices is concerned that the basic dignity of the suffering and dying person, and his 
or her family, is being disregarded in favor of antiquated laws.  On the other side, Not 
Dead Yet is concerned that the basic dignity of people with disabilities is under an 
intense, new level of threat from medical euthanasia which puts the devaluing of those 
with disabilities to the new extreme (at least outside of tyrannical cleansing) of simply 
allowing, condoning, and causing their death for no reason other than disability. 
 The key point is that—pace Behuniak and despite appearances—each side in the 
medical euthanasia debate is defending the same basic value: basic dignity.  But the 
rhetoric of each side reveals that each side takes itself to be alone in defending that value.  
From the point of view of Not Dead Yet, it is defending basic dignity while opposition 
groups incorrectly, even monstrously, place personal dignity ahead of basic dignity in the 
overall scheme of values.  From the point of view of Compassion and Choices, it is 
defending the autonomy of the terminally ill from the pressure of opposition groups who 




Choices believes they must defend the terminally ill from groups who would sacrifice the 
personhood of the terminally ill on the altars of their lives.  
 Each side is thus living in a reality, or narrative world, which is characterized by 
different, fundamentally incompatible conceptions of both their own and others’ roles, 
concerns, and actions.  These differing conceptions shape and limit what each side finds 
itself able to imagine about the experiences, needs, and arguments of others who exist in, 
or conceive through, an incompatible reality (or worldview).  Each side can, more-or-less 
literally, not even imagine that the other side is doing something which can be 
characterized as “defending basic dignity.”  Therefore, each side cannot imagine that the 
other side is genuinely respecting the highest interests of those who are dying and/or 
disabled. 
 As previously noted, I explore these claims and the evidence for them at length in 
Chapter 5.  First, we must understand the theory that helps me to arrive at these, and more 







CHAPTER 3. DEFINING IMAGINATIVE RESISTANCE IN PHILOSOPHY 
3.1 Introducing Imaginative Resistance 
Imaginative resistance is a concept that comes out of a contemporary philosophic debate 
that bridges areas ranging from aesthetics to philosophy of mind, and is rooted in 
arguments from philosopher and cognitive scientist Tamar Szabó Gendler and 
philosophers Kendall Walton and Brian Weatherson.  Defined simply, imaginative 
resistance occurs when a reader becomes unwilling or unable to engage with a work of 
fiction due to propositions within the work.  This is interesting because readers, 
according to philosophers engaged in this debate, usually allow authors to define every 
dimension of a fictional world.  Why, then, are there kinds of claims, such as deviant 
moral claims, that readers appear to reject and respond to with a disengagement from the 
work of fiction?  In the next section, I delve into debates on, and divisions of, imaginative 
resistance, but, for now, we will consider this a relatively unified theory. 
 A classic example of a sentence in a work of fiction that we are supposed to resist 
is the following: 
 
(A) In killing her baby, Giselda did the right thing; after all, it was 




 It is important to understand that in (A) the narrator of the fiction is the one 
talking—not some deranged character within the narrative—and the narrator is intended 
to be taken as stating a truth about the fictional world.  The narrator is telling the reader 
that it is true in this particular fictional world that the killing of female babies is morally 
correct.  While we may tolerate this kind of statement from a character in a work of 
fiction, or even as a characterization of the beliefs of an entire culture, we will not 
tolerate, according to the general theory of imaginative resistance, this kind of statement 
from a narrator of the type that is supposed to present objective truth-claims about the 
fictional world.  If the narrator attempts to assert that (A) is simply true in the fictional 
world then the reader will reject the assertion.  The reader may experience what is 
referred to as a “doubling of the narrator,” a response in which the reader simply views 
the author as mistaken rather than ascribing to, and asserting, the truths of the fictional 
world (Gendler, 2000), or a number of other specific responses defined in the debate.  
However, it is generally agreed upon that readers will (or should) experience imaginative 
resistance to (A) because an impossible or fundamentally objectionable truth-claim has 
been asserted. 
 The so-called puzzle of imaginative resistance comes about by observing the 
conflict between these two claims: 
 
(1) Readers seem to have little trouble imagining or accepting 
fictional worlds that contain truths that do not exist in the actual (or 





(2) Readers seem far less tolerant of deviations in moral truths in 
works of fiction, such as it being true in a fictional world that it is 
right to kill someone for slowing traffic (Weatherson, 2004), or 
logical truths such as the features of shapes (Yablo, 2002) or basic 
mathematics (Gendler, 2000). 
 
 In other words, why is it that readers will accept a great variety of impossible and 
fantastical truths in a fictional world, but eventually draw a line at certain types of claims?  
Why will readers reject amoral truth-claims, illogical assertions, or violations of basic 
mathematics?  Theories of imaginative resistance can be thought of as attempts to solve 
this so-called puzzle. 
 Work in philosophy to date, though, has assumed these theories to be exclusively 
about works of fiction because they have taken for granted a third claim: 
 
(3) This phenomenon is unique to reader engagement with works 
of fiction, and perhaps even only, literary fiction due to the 
explicitness of communication between the author and reader 
(Nanay, 2010). 
 
 Literary fiction, here, is the subset of fictional works which are written, such as 
novels and epic poetry.  Examples of non-literary fiction for which some philosophers 
have argued that imaginative resistance does not—or cannot—occur include film and 




author or narrator which makes explicit truth-claims.  In works without explicit truth 
claims, the receiver may be able to interpret information in a greater variety of ways, 
allowing for less pressure to resist truth-claims.  I discuss exactly what this means in 
detail in the coming pages. 
 Given that this philosophic debate was inspired by an aside by David Hume about 
epic poetry, which I discuss shortly, (3) has been an unchallenged assumption since the 
debate began.  It has been assumed by the philosophers in this debate, and, in the case of 
Nanay (2010), explicitly noted, that there is something special about the depth of 
communication between an author and reader that simply is not present in other media.  
One receives more explicit information about the fictional world in the narrative claims 
of authors than one does in most, if not all, movies, music, or other artistic media.  The 
explicitness of this communication and the understanding by the reader that certain 
claims made by the narrator are authorial truth-claim declarations of a reality they wish 
the reader to consider as true is central to my argument.  This layer of perceived author-
reader communication about reality is essential to understanding how imaginative 
resistance applies to broader, real-world communication. 
 As noted, I am interested in seeing how theories developed in response to the 
puzzle generated by (1) and (2) can be employed to understand issues of polarization in 
the medical euthanasia debate.  Therefore, as noted, I am deeply concerned with, and 





3.1.1 Current Debates: Four Key Hypotheses 
The concept of “imaginative resistance” was first introduced by philosopher and 
cognitive scientist Tamar Szabó Gendler (2000) in response to an article on fictional 
morality by Kendall Walton and Michael Tanner (1994).  Gendler and others trace the 
idea back to David Hume.  In “On the Standard of Taste” (1985/1757), Hume makes a 
series of relevant observations: 
 
Where speculative errors may be found in the polite writings of 
any age or country, they detract but little from the value of those 
compositions.  There needs to be but a certain turn of thought or 
imagination to make us enter into all the opinions, which then 
prevailed, and relish the sentiments or conclusions derived from 
them.  But a very violent effort is requisite to change our judgment 
of manners, and excite sentiments of approbation or blame, love or 
hatred, different from those to which the mind for long custom has 
been familiarized….I cannot, nor is it proper that I should, enter 
into such sentiments.  (p. 247, emphasis in original) 
 
 Hume’s original point was that morally jarring claims or episodes in a work of 
fiction make it difficult for the reader to smoothly enjoy the work of fiction, and so 
should be regarded as flaws.  Morally flawed artworks are, for Hume, aesthetically 
flawed; and it is correct to so judge them.  In response to Hume, Walton (1994) claims 




cause imaginative resistance) in readers does not necessarily result in an aesthetic 
deformity of the work, as characterized by a blemish on the artistic value of the work (p. 
29).  In fact, we should be able to “regard the work as possessing aesthetic value,” 
regardless of its moral content (Walton & Tanner, 1994, p. 29).  The question of whether 
we should permit the moral content of a work of fiction to affect our judgment of the 
work’s aesthetic value, as opposed to whether it is psychologically necessary, is an 
ethical question.  That Walton and Hume provide opposing answers to this ethical 
question first underscores a profound difference in their characterizations of imaginative 
resistance.   
Walton describes an intellectual phenomenon, a limit to the imagination which is 
divorced from emotion, while Hume describes an experience which has deep emotional 
and corresponding physical and intellectual manifestations.  These feelings of repulsion 
and anger, even righteous anger, are strong responses, resulting in a reflexive refusal to 
appreciate the aesthetics of the work as separate from its moral content.  This is a very 
strong response which is more accurately described by Gendler than by Walton. 
 In “Imaginative Resistance Revisited” (2006b), Gendler disagrees with Walton.  
She articulates the relevant aspects of the above passage from Hume, and calls this 
“Humean resistance.”  Humean resistance requires two aspects: 
 
(1) Cases of the “troubling class” (i.e., which cause Humean 
resistance) involve “valenced normative appraisals” (Gendler, 





(2) These cases “require the reader’s imaginative involvement” (p. 
153, emphasis in original). 
 
 With regard to (1), we are being asked to make judgments about the rightness or 
wrongness, the mannerliness or unmannerliness, or praiseworthiness or blameworthiness 
of something along a normative spectrum (Gendler, 2006b).  With regard to (2), being 
asked to imagine (rather than simply postulate) is an active engagement, not a passive 
one.  It is the reader herself who is being asked to make this judgment, to perhaps agree 
with depictions in the work, and to “enter into” some “vicious” frame of mind by 
engaging with the written work (Gendler, 2006b). 
 Gendler recognizes a point about Hume’s work here that has been customarily 
overlooked in the recent work on imaginative resistance: Hume was making observations 
“primarily” about non-fiction rather than fiction (2006b, pp. 149-150).  Of course, since 
the concern of the current thesis is the prospect for using imaginative resistance in 
communication studies, Gendler’s observation is fortuitous.  However, what remains true 
is that Hume is discussing written works of non-fiction.  In this thesis, I suggest that not 
only are philosophers currently focusing too narrowly on fiction, but that both Hume and 
the contemporary philosophers are wrong to assume that this is primarily a concern of 
written works.  I return to this issue in Sections III and IV. 
 Walton’s argument includes appraisals of aesthetic value, but also appraisals of 
reader rejection (1994).  Walton argues that imaginative resistance occurs when the 
reader’s moral reality conflicts with a fictional morality being presented as true for the 




believing morally deviant claims, she is unable to imagine sufficient justifications for the 
deviant claims and, therefore, cannot conceive of a world in which the deviant claims are 
actually true rather than just mistakenly believed by a character or society (1994, p. 49).  
As such, the reader is unable to imagine this fictional world as a morally possible world 
(1994, p. 49).  Walton argues that this occurs because moral principles supervene upon 
non-moral facts, thus making it impossible for an author to present acts such as genocide 
or slavery as moral and avoid causing imaginative resistance in readers who subscribe to 
“appropriate,” contemporary moral standards (1994, p. 45). 
 Gendler calls Walton’s theory the impossibility hypothesis (Gendler, 2000, p. 66) 
or, later, a version of the cantian theories (Gendler, 2006b; Liao & Gendler, in press).  In 
other words, Walton is asserting that imaginative resistance occurs because the reader 
cannot engage with the fictional claim, whereas Gendler is asserting that imaginative 
resistance occurs because the reader will not engage with the fictional claim. 
 In “The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance” (2000), Gendler argues that the 
impossibility hypothesis is false, that Walton has not found “the source” of the puzzle (pp. 
56 and 66, emphasis added).  According to Gendler, it is not that a reader is incapable of 
imagining a morally deviant fictional world, but rather that the reader is unwilling to do 
so (Gendler, 2000, 2006b; Liao & Gendler, in press).  She argues that we fear we may be 
manipulated into believing a deviant moral claim in the real world if we permit ourselves 
to entertain the idea that it is true in the fictional world (Gendler, 2000, p. 56).  In other 
words, simply imagining deviant moral claims may cause moral contagion, an 
inadvertent absorption of ideas we disapprove of through an involuntary psychological 




“perfect pretender” would be able to imagine claims, ideas, or realities which are untrue 
while maintaining the awareness that they are untrue, both intellectually and behaviorally 
(Gendler, 2006a).  However, as imperfect pretenders, people may still intellectually 
understand that something is not true while nevertheless being infected behaviorally or 
subconsciously by the imagined ideas, which Gendler notes is supported by findings in 
psychology which have tested participant response to a variety of situations with or 
without having first imagined certain situations, such as additional bystanders who could 
respond to an emergency when none are actually present (2006a).  We will call this 
approach the moral contagion hypothesis. 
 Gendler bases her conclusions on a set of observations.  She observes that there 
are many facts and beliefs about the actual world which are imported into fiction (such as 
period dress or details of a submarine in realistic fiction or even humanoid appearance or 
parent-child relationships in science fiction, perhaps).  In addition to these imported facts 
or beliefs, there is an impetus to export ideas as well (such as details about period dress or 
submarines one did not previously know) (Gendler, 2000, p. 76).  Therefore, moral 
claims are, or threaten to be, exported from the fictional world into the actual world, 
which causes readers to resist deviant moral claims which they fear they may come to 
believe are true in the actual world (Gendler, 2000, 2006a). 
 Using Liao & Gendler’s (in press; Gendler, 2006b) terms, Walton’s impossibility 
hypothesis is one of two essential cantian perspectives, whereas Gendler’s moral 
contagion hypothesis is the essential wontian perspective.  Cantian perspectives, as noted, 
emphasize that readers cannot imagine what the author is asking them to imagine, 




 There are two other approaches that are essential to understanding the 
contemporary debate, and its applicability to real-world communication.  The first comes 
from Brian Weatherson (2004), and his, as categorized by Gendler, is also a cantian 
perspective (Liao & Gendler, in press).  The second, which I discuss subsequently, is 
from Brence Nanay (2010), who proposes a sort of wontian perspective focused on genre 
and conversational implicature. 
 In “Morality, Fiction, and Possibility”, Weatherson (2004) argues for what I call 
the attention-to-conflict hypothesis.  According to this hypothesis, imaginative resistance 
occurs when ethical or intellectual claims are made by an author which we believe are 
untrue or impossible and are sufficiently featured in the story to attract attention to the 
problem (p. 18).  In other words, we can ignore impossibilities which are not made clear 
to us, such as the impossibility of a cow jumping over the moon, but we will reject it if 
the details of the cow’s physiology and the nature of outer space are discussed, as such 
details would highlight the impossibility of the scenario (pp. 10-11, 18).  Contradictory 
claims are key to Weatherson’s hypothesis.  An author cannot successfully claim that a 
knife and fork are actually a television and an armchair (unless, presumably, the knife 
and fork could transform) (pp. 5, 14-15), that a five-fingered maple leaf is actually the 
shape of an oval (p. 4), or that murdering two people for slowing traffic is morally 
praiseworthy (pp. 1-2).  Each of these examples should cause imaginative resistance, 
Weatherson claims, in part because the details of the contradictions which cause 
resistance are emphasized (p. 18). 
 Importantly for what is to come, Weatherson’s argument suggests that claims in a 




claims that it is the author who wields this power by controlling how fictional claims are 
presented (2004, pp. 18, 20), but the reader, too, chooses or wills what to care about and 
what to ignore.  Readers who are practiced in the art of ignoring information they find 
ridiculous or problematic are necessarily less likely to experience imaginative resistance 
than are those who have carefully sensitized themselves to inconsistencies.  In other 
words, readers have, or may have in various cases, a choice about whether they 
experience imaginative resistance to inaccurate nonmoral claims or deviant moral claims.  
This choice is not one which is made in the moment of potential resistance, but rather one 
made through the cultivation of certain reading habits over time. 
 Nanay (2010) proposes what I refer to as the inappropriate communication 
hypothesis, which can be understood as a wontian perspective.  Nanay argues that 
imaginative resistance should be understood fundamentally as a response to inappropriate 
communication (2010).  Nanay draws upon Gregory Currie (2003) to emphasize that 
fiction is a type of conversation.  As Currie puts it, we are right to “think of story-telling 
as a rather one-sided conversation” (2003, p. 146).  Nanay then draws upon H. P. Grice’s 
theory of conversational implicature (1975) to claim that imaginative resistance is a 
reaction to fictional claims which the author made in violation of the cooperative 
principle.  The cooperative principle is a rule for conversation which we naturally obey, 
according to Grice.  According to this principle, a conversation should and is expected to 
continue from one relevant comment to the next relevant comment.  If a comment is 
made which does not appear to be relevant, the message-receiver of this seemingly 
irrelevant message works to interpret the message under the assumption that it is making 




(Grice, 1975).  In other words, when you violate the cooperative principle, others assume 
you are making a hidden point, and they seek to understand it as such.  The following 
conversational example is given in Grice’s “Logic and Conversation” (1975): 
 
A: Smith doesn’t seem to have a girlfriend these days. 
B: He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately. 
 
 Taken at face value, Person B has responded with a non sequitur.  However, one 
takes B to be implying that Smith has a girlfriend in New York (Grice, 1975).  This 
assumption can be made due to the rule of conversation that responses should be relevant.  
It may be that Person B has no intention of making this claim, but if that is true, B has 
violated the cooperative principle.  As such, Person A must work to interpret the 
implications of B’s statement, and this work can cause pause in conversation which is the 
same as the pause a reader experiences in what is often referred to as imaginative 
resistance, according to Nanay (2010).  Nanay further suggests that we do not experience 
imaginative resistance equally across genres, and this is because we have different 
expectations for adherence to the cooperative principle based upon the genre with which 
we are engaged (2010).  
 Each of the above-noted hypotheses is important for the analysis of applying 
imaginative resistance to communication.  Before we continue, I will summarize the 
above types.  As noted, these hypotheses fall into the following two categories, created 




(1) Cantian Perspectives: Imaginative resistance is rooted in a 
reader’s absolute inability to imagine a proposed aspect of a 
fictional world. 
 
(2) Wontian Perspectives: Imaginative resistance is rooted in a 
reader’s refusal to imagine a proposed aspect of a fictional world. 
 
 Briefly, the four key hypotheses discussed above are as follows: 
 
(1) Impossibility Hypothesis: Walton’s cantian perspective is that 
imaginative resistance is caused by immutable supervenience 
relationships between a reader’s moral reality and the fictional 
moral reality presented by the author. 
 
(2) Moral Contagion Hypothesis: Gendler’s perspective that 
imaginative resistance is caused by the wontian refusal to engage 
in imaginative acts with deviant moral claims for fear that one 
might be infected in some way by the deviant morality simply 
through the act of imagining it. 
 
(3) Attention-to-Conflict Hypothesis: Weatherson’s cantian 
perspective which claims that impossibility to engage is 




the author’s choices of how to depict or the reader’s choices in 
how to engage with it. 
 
(4) Inappropriate Communication Hypothesis: Nanay’s wontian 
perspective that imaginative resistance is experienced as a 
violation of the Gricean cooperative principle in a conversation 
between author and reader.  The reader then refuses to engage with 
the text as written, instead searching for implications that can 
explain away the violation. 
 
 It is important to note that Gendler argues that sometimes an unwillingness to 
engage with an idea imaginatively can result in an inability to do so (2006b, p. 156).  
Therefore, even if we agree with the cantian perspectives, we can evaluate them in terms 
of whether at the root there is an unwillingness causing the impossibility of imagining. 
 
3.1.1.1 Types of Imaginative Resistance 
Gendler and other theorists not only distinguish between types of hypotheses regarding 
imaginative resistance but also aspects of the phenomenon itself.  These become central 
to distinguishing between aspects of these hypotheses which are relevant to 




 For the sake of this thesis, I focus on one characterization of the types of 
imaginative resistance.  Shen-yi Liao and Gendler (in press) piece apart the debate along 
the lines of four different puzzles, which can be understood as follows: 
 
(1) Imaginability Puzzle: Why do readers sometimes refuse, or find 
themselves unable to accept, the invitation to make-believe which 
is standard to engagement with works of fiction?  (Liao & Gendler, 
in press) 
 
 (2) Fictionality Puzzle: Why, when readers typically accept the 
authority of authors to define the terms of their fictional world 
(“authorial authority”), do readers sometimes reject this authority 
as insufficient to allow for certain kinds of claims?  (Liao & 
Gendler, in press) 
 
(3) Phenomenological Puzzle: Why do readers sometimes 
understand the author to be asking the reader to believe a 
proposition in the real world which is made in the fictional world 
rather than simply imagine that it is true only to the fictional world?  





(4) Aesthetic Value Puzzle: Why do readers sometimes find that a 
work of fiction is aesthetically compromised by claims made 
within it?  (Liao & Gendler, in press) 
 
 The imaginability puzzle is addressed by all four hypotheses discussed in the 
previous section, and is the most consistently addressed puzzle by philosophers in the 
debate regarding imaginative resistance.  This puzzle highlights the strangeness of 
readers being unable or unwilling to imagine certain propositions even while engaging 
with fiction, where the invitation to imagine is central.  What we can and cannot imagine 
or what we are willing or unwilling to imagine are central to any theory of imaginative 
resistance, including those applicable to other forms of communication. 
 The fictionality puzzle or puzzle of the breakdown of authorial authority is 
addressed by many philosophers engaged in this debate.  This puzzle is based on the 
assumption that the author has a default authority in dictating the terms and fictional 
reality of her work.  Whether or not we agree with this assumption, the fictionality puzzle 
highlights how particular claims made by an author can result in the author losing her 
authority to dictate the terms of her fictional reality. 
 The phenomenological puzzle is a contested assertion by philosophers in this 
debate.  Are authors sometimes asking readers to believe when they should only be 
asking readers to imagine?  Or are there claims themselves that whenever uttered are 
necessarily assertions about real-world reality rather than fictional reality? 
 The aesthetic value puzzle is addressed by Hume, Walton, and only a few others 




This puzzle may seem to be the most obviously limited to works of fiction, at least to 
those engaged in the debate.  After all, aesthetic value is an appraisal of art forms.  







CHAPTER 4. IMAGINATIVE RESISTANCE AND COMMUNICATION 
4.1 Narrowing the Puzzles 
While all of the aforementioned puzzles can be applied to real-world (rather than fictional) 
communication, for the sake of this thesis, I argue that the imaginability puzzle and 
fictionality puzzle are the most obviously useful in the field of communication.  To 
understand this, I redefine these two puzzles based on broader, communicative 
definitions: 
 
(1) Imaginability Puzzle: Imagination is a key to open-mindedness.  
We must be both willing and able to imagine narratives presented 
by a message-sender in order to receive the message in a way close 
to how it was intended.  Why do we sometimes refuse, or find 
ourselves unable to accept, the invitation to imagine the viewpoints 
of someone else, when doing so is a basic requirement of engaging 
with others? 
 
(2) Fictionality Puzzle (better regarded here as the Breakdown of 




see them as the foremost experts in their fictional world.  Similarly, 
we allow experts to make all kinds of claims about material we do 
not understand, and we usually accept these claims on the basis 
that they are made for the experts.  Why do message-receivers 
sometimes reject this authority as insufficient to allow for certain 
kinds of claims even when the expert has not overstepped the 
boundaries of their expertise? 
 
4.1.1 The Imaginability Puzzle 
The imaginability puzzle, I believe, is absolutely essential to understanding our current 
climate of escalating polarization.  Why is it that when people attempt to have a 
conversation and then ground their communication style in opposing narratives do the 
individuals reject even the invitation to imagine the other person’s perspective?  Is it 
because, as Gendler would argue regarding fiction, that one is concerned about moral 
contagion?  I will leave the medical euthanasia debate here, and consider another 
example, to illustrate the phenomenon in a broader arena.  Consider the following 
common (though perhaps unusually tame) dialogue between a religious Pro-Life activist, 
A, and an atheist Pro-Choice activist, B: 
 
A: How can you even think about murdering your own child? 
B: It’s not murder, and it’s not a child.  It’s a fetus.  I’m a person, 




A: Your rights don’t trump the rights of a child. 
B: It’s not a child.  It’s a fetus. 
A: Life begins at conception. 
B: A zygote begins at conception.  Sure, late-term abortion might 
be pretty harsh, but early-term abortion isn’t murder.  The fetus 
isn’t a person yet.  I, however, am a person.  I have rights to my 
own bodily integrity.  I am not an incubator or prisoner. 
A: Motherhood is sacred.  God gave you that child.  It was your 
choice to have sex, and so you already chose to have this baby. 
B: Sex has other purposes than reproduction.  And God had 
nothing to do with this.  A little plastic condom broke. 
A: As God intended. 
 
 In the above example, Person A and Person B are talking past one another, 
because their communication is situated in different narratives and different narrative-
based values.  Most of us can easily imagine conversations such as these not going as 
well as the above conversation.  Often, two people with such dramatically opposed views 
will argue heatedly and end the conversation with deep resentment or even hatred.  In the 
above example, A and B sometimes engage and directly reject each other’s narrative 




A is unwilling or unable to imagine that B is correct, that the fetus in question is not a 
baby and that terminating it is not murder.  Her deeply held values, which are based in, 
and often asserted through, religious, communal, and societal narratives, are incompatible 
with the narratives B presents.  B is likewise unwilling or unable to imagine that A is 
correct. 
 Perhaps the best way to understand A and B’s refusal to engage with opposing 
narratives is to understand that their values have been developed through intricate 
communication.  To even imagine the opposing narrative would be to risk being 
influenced by it.  Here we see Gendler’s moral contagion hypothesis at work.  Each 
interlocutor is worried that she will be infected by the viewpoints of the other if she dares 
to merely imagine the key points of the opposing narrative. 
 
4.1.1.1 Breakdown of Authority Puzzle 
What about authorial authority, or, what I call the breakdown of authority puzzle?  If we 
consider authors to be foremost experts on their world communicating to us in a sort of 
narrative lecture about the world, we can see how this expertise is similar to say, a 
foremost expert in evolutionary biology or organizational communication, or, perhaps, 
the foremost expert in their own experiences.  Unless we have reason to doubt the ability 
of the expert before engaging, we are likely to take assertions of her expertise to be 
reason to believe when she make claims within her area of expertise.  But what if we 
engage with an author’s work after a friend we trust tells us that she is a terrible writer?  




evolutionary biologist after our pastor tells us that this person or this field of inquiry 
cannot be trusted?  In these cases, the credibility of the expert (or the expert’s topic) has 
been injured by testimonies received or narratives engaged with and believed prior to the 
act of communication.  As is well-known, a communicator can lose credibility before, 
during, or after an act of communication.  If, during the act of communication, a speaker 
presents false information or communicates in a way that offends the audience, the 
audience may stop engaging with the speaker.  But why?  I believe the answer is, in part, 
imaginative resistance. 
 
4.1.1.1.1 Offenses Causing Imaginative Resistance 
In my own evaluation, imaginative resistance can be understood as resulting from two 
kinds of offenses: (1) value offenses and (2) communication offenses.  And, in most cases, 
both offenses exist at the same time.  Value offenses are experienced when message-
receivers resist a claim because it violates their deeply held values, which, are themselves, 
rooted in narratives (Fisher, 1984).  Communication offenses, on the other hand, are 
violations of accepted or expected communicative roles, styles, or narratives.   If we 
sometimes refuse (or are unwilling) to imagine a claim, it may be because (1) it violates 
our deeply held values or (2) because the person making the claim does not have the 
authority to appropriately do so.  The latter encompasses the fictionality puzzle as well as 
the imaginability puzzle.  We may also experience the phenomenological puzzle for 
either reason, either because a claim violates our values so deeply that we feel that if the 




interlocutor about the real world) it must be that the author is asking us to challenge our 
beliefs and believe the other’s deviant assertion, or because we understand the author to 
have overstepped her bounds as a world-creator and stepped into the realm of value-
dictating in the real world.  Again, these are overlapping interpretations.  The aesthetic 
value puzzle is represented by either offense as well.  In new traditions of rhetoric, we 
often assess appropriate artistry and approaches to communication based on act, scene, 
agent, agency, and purpose.  Lack of fit to any of these purposes can result in a speech (or 
other act of communication) to be judged inappropriate and lose some or all aesthetic 
value.  Lack of fit to any of these purposes can also result in value offenses, such as those 
that can occur when someone reveals beliefs which are opposed by people in the 
audience or other interlocutors in interpersonal or small-group communication. 
 Nanay, as we saw, claims that imaginative resistance is simply a response to 
violations in the Gricean cooperative principle (2010).  Liao & Gendler (in press) later 
argue that perspectives like Nanay’s mistake short-term confusion for enduring resistance, 
the former of which is not imaginative resistance.  In fact, Gendler mentions the Gricean 
cooperative principle in one of her articles and dismisses it outright (2006b).  While it 
seems reasonable to assess Nanay as having been confused about how to apply the 
cooperative principle, Nanay nevertheless makes an important observation: The 
conversational aspects of the author-reader relationship are central to understanding the 





4.1.1.1.2 Referents and Appraisal 
In “Imaginative Resistance Revisited” (2006b), Gendler notes that there is a difference 
between concepts such as “maggots” or “bumblebees” and those such as “right” or “true.”  
She does not define the difference, however, except to imply that the latter are related to 
morality.  I argue, instead, that the former have real-world referents, while the latter are 
complex concepts which we develop, maintain, and augment purely through 
communication, which makes them especially important to us and also susceptible to 
being altered if we allow ourselves to engage opposing viewpoints.  We cannot, in other 
words, simply point to “rightness” in the real world to remind ourselves of what it is and 
undo any sway the communication process has had over us. 
 Even when we combine creatures in myth, we have real-world referents in which 
to ground their combined features.  What is a Pegasus besides a “horse” with “wings,” 
two things that exist clearly in the world.  “Rightness” and “goodness,” as noted, are 
concepts that we come to understand through complex engagement with the world which 
is rooted in communication on a variety of levels from intrapersonal to organizational and 
cultural.  We struggle as we grow up to develop values, and those around us struggle to 
guide us toward values they hold.  Our parents need not worry about whether we 
understand that a cat is a cat, because a cat is always a cat.  This is simply taught through 
picture-books, TV images, and petting furry felines in the real world.  But across groups 
and cultures, we disagree about what “rightness” and “goodness” are.  We disagree 
because no one can point to something and say, “There it is!  Goodness!”  Instead, 
through conversation with those around us which are often rooted in broader, ancient 




and maintain a particular picture of these concepts.  And, so, these concepts are rooted in 
communication and rooted in narrative. 
 Appraisal, which Gendler argues is essential to understanding what causes 
imaginative resistance (2006b), does come into play with concepts such as “rightness” or 
“goodness,” but perhaps it is not the moral nature of these questions per se that makes 
them more likely to evoke imaginative resistance but rather the depth of the narrative 
conflict in the surrounding culture.  Our parents and communities often take our moral 
upbringing to be of paramount importance.  Other things of such depth of importance, as 
taught, can cause equally serious cases of imaginative resistance.  Imagine, for example, 
a man who was raised to believe that being macho is a requirement of his basic worth so 
much so that his social ties, status, and even survival may be threatened if he is not 
macho.  If this man is faced with narratives which seem to attack his masculinity, he is 
likely to resist, to refuse to engage those narratives because they pose a threat to his 





CHAPTER 5. IMAGINATIVE RESISTANCE IN THE MEDICAL EUTHANASIA 
DEBATE 
5.1 Goals for the Application of Imaginative Resistance 
Let’s return to the passage in my introduction from I. A. Richards, “[T]he chief lesson to 
be learnt…is the futility of all argumentation that precedes understanding.  We cannot 
profitably attack any opinion until we have discovered what it expresses as well as what 
it states…” (Richards, 1991, p. 28).  Whether our goal is to attack, defend, mediate, or 
appeal to, Richards’ insight applies.  Arguing without understanding the perspective of 
the other side or sides is not only futile but carries the potential to deepen polarization 
and its associated animosity (Doherty, 2014), by playing into conflicting rhetoric. 
 The primary goal, then, of the application of the theory of imaginative resistance 
to cases of conflicting rhetoric, is to try to uncover the worldview, or reality, of each side, 
so that the mutual unimaginability of narratives which prevents active and effective 
discussion can be mitigated, and to examine reasons each side may have for resisting due 
to concerns over contagion, as defined by Gendler. 
 
5.1.1 Methods 
The theory of imaginative resistance in communication proposes that there are situations 
in which communication breaks down between parties because one, both, or all sides find 




The arguments, claims, or even terms used by the other side clash deeply with one’s 
deeply held beliefs—beliefs held so deeply that it is, rather than just a heated discussion 
or ideological battle, a battle between incompatible realities. 
 To evaluate whether this theory is viable, one should first examine the apparent 
polarization in the debate.  When polarization appears to be present, it becomes important 
to read arguments, claims, and perspectives made by the targeted side or sides as well as 
reading research about the experience and perspectives of each side, or conducting this 
research yourself.  For the sake of this thesis, I am focusing on the perspective of Not 
Dead Yet, and utilizing Not Dead Yet and broader disability rights sources and studies to 
uncover issues in compatibility between their perspective and that of Compassion & 
Choices, and, perhaps, the broader culture.  I have reviewed most of Behuniak’s sources 
on Not Dead Yet which remain available; as well as broader sources from Not Dead Yet; 
including writings by Lydia Brown, a disability rights activist they regularly praise and 
who sometimes authors posts for their “News & Commentary” blog; and several sources 
from Compassion & Choices.  I have also reviewed several books and articles about the 
medical euthanasia debate which discuss the disability rights perspective as well as 
Disability Rhetoric, a volume by rhetorician Jay Dolmage.  Through these sources, I 
sought to answer the following questions: 
 





(2) If so, from what worldview or perspective is Not Dead Yet 
approaching this debate which is incompatible with that of 
Compassion & Choices? 
 
(3) How can this worldview be articulated in a way that 
experientially illustrates the reasons behind Not Dead Yet’s 
perspective and basic dignity rhetoric in a way that may be 
understood by members of Compassion and Choices? 
 
(4) What about this worldview, if anything, may suggest reasons 
for resistance due to concerns over contagion. 
 
5.1.1.1 Is Imaginative Resistance Occurring? 
Perhaps it is true that some polarization occurs because sides simply disagree strongly 
without existing in, and perceiving through, distinctly different realities.  I claim, though, 
that where there is polarization with corresponding aggression and animosity, there is 
likely to also be imaginative resistance.  Therefore, the first question is whether there is 
polarization in this debate. 
 In the broader disability activist perspectives on medical euthanasia, there is 
definite disagreement about how people with disabilities should be protected, but there is 
overall agreement that the best protection is to prevent the legalization of medical 




among disability activists is to oppose any and all legalization of medical euthanasia 
because of the perceived threat it poses to people with disabilities.  Furthermore, Not 
Dead Yet regularly states that all—or most—disability rights activists oppose legalized 
medical euthanasia because of its danger (Not Dead Yet, 2010, as cited in Behuniak, 
2011; Not Dead Yet, 2015). 
 Let’s look at three examples of how Not Dead Yet frames the issue of medical 
euthanasia: (1) Not Dead Yet discusses the history of their organization as a response to 
the deadly “wake up call for the disability rights movement,” which they outline as 
follows: “Society’s response” to disabled patients wanting “freedom” from nursing 
homes was “denying them freedom, but granting them death” (Not Dead Yet, 2015).  (2) 
Not Dead Yet emphasizes that physicians are “gatekeepers”: “Anyone could ask for 
assisted suicide, but physicians decide who gets it” (Not Dead Yet, 2015).  Physicians 
decide who is terminally ill and will die within six months—all of whom Not Dead Yet 
says are disabled—and it is “well documented” that physicians often make mistakes 
about who will die when (Not Dead Yet, 2015).  According to a Not Dead Yet blog post 
by activist Lydia Brown (2015, February 5), “Many disabled people live with severe, 
chronic pain, multiple co-occurring physical, cognitive, and psychiatric conditions, and 
repeated and incorrect prognoses of early deaths.”  (3) As a related issue, ableism is 
regarded as a constant pressure and danger.  According to Brown’s post (2015, February 
5) “Our world is dominated by public discourse that considers disabled lives inherently 
defective, burdensome, suffering, and not worth living.”  Increasing the aforementioned 
dangers, Brown says, are numerous holes in the safeguards in legalized medical 




confirm that a patient was terminal, allows caregivers or heirs to gain and administer 
lethal doses to patients potentially without that patient’s free consent, and does not 
protect patients from being “coerced” into receiving medical euthanasia by insurance 
companies which prefer to cut costs by terminating the patient than paying for her health 
care coverage, all of which can be seen as dangerous extensions of ableism in a broken 
healthcare system (2015, February 5). 
 When you visit the Not Dead Yet website, and then visit the Compassion & 
Choices website, there are several things that may immediately jump out at you.  The Not 
Dead Yet website has a horror-movie style logo, which shares more in common with a 
social movement like Anonymous, the loosely organized international coalition of 
“hacktivists” (hacker-activists) which takes an aggressive rhetorical and practical stance, 
than with Compassion & Choices.  The logo has certain inconsistencies which suggest a 
less professional origin than the logo for Compassion & Choices.  The website uses black, 
white, and a single shade of grayish navy blue.  The website is clearly active, illustrated 
by ongoing news and commentary listed in a single, thick column down the center, and 
on its own, the website seems like it may be well-supported.  However, when you click 
over to Compassion & Choices, the difference in level of support, power, and confidence 
within the system is striking. 
 The clean, upbeat corporate lines, logos, and overall professionalism of the 
Compassion & Choices website shows that the group not only has a gentler persona, but 
also money and connections (2015).  The page has a white and multi-hue blue color 
scheme which is soothing and supportive.  This supportiveness is echoed in pictures of 




flowers or being embraced by loved ones or even celebrities.  There is a helpline link, 
with a gentle orange logo, which reads, “Call an End-of-Life Consultant” (Compassion & 
Choices, 2015).  One column over, there is a large “Take Action” image in blues and the  
same gentle orange, which encourages you to engage with the movement in your state.  
Not Dead Yet claims that a dangerous power in the voices of their progressive opponents 
is their “privilege” (Brown, 2015, February 5).  One can see privilege and power just on 
their website home page.  That this apparent privilege is being actively embraced and 
used for political and social capital by Compassion & Choices on their site and 
condemned distantly by Not Dead Yet and other disability rights activists shows a divide 
and, again, echoes the less powerful situation in which disability rights activists find 
themselves. 
 Rhetoric, both textual and visual, support a sharp divide in perspective, values, 
and power between the two groups, Not Dead Yet and Compassion & Choices.  These 
details, plus that each side has opposite advocacy in the medical euthanasia debate and 
their consistent and continuous unwillingness to engage with one another on their stated 
issues of value—“death with dignity” for Compassion & Choices and safeguarding 
threatened people with disabilities for Not Dead Yet—suggests polarization is present. 
 
5.1.1.1.1 Living in a World of Disability and Ability Myth 
A major issue for disability rights activists is their perceived operation within a world that 
devalues people with disabilities, and their existence.  On the home page for Not Dead 




corresponding lines such as “The message was loud and clear: ‘I can help you die…’” 
and “The doctor said it would be better if I didn’t survive” (2015).   Blog posts, news 
bulletins, pamphlets, and action memos all reflect this deep concern that able-bodied 
doctors will encourage those with disabilities to take advantage of medical euthanasia due 
to prejudice. 
 For the purpose of establishing the nature of the reality that is perceived by Not 
Dead Yet, it does not matter whether these claims from disabled patients are real, nor 
whether they accurately reflect the attitudes and suggestions of doctors that they 
encounter.  However, investigations of actual and perceived experience are essential to 
understanding one’s reality or worldview.  In this case, the concerns voiced by Not Dead 
Yet are verified by academic studies which have outlined ways in which people with 
disabilities are treated as lesser in our culture and even encouraged to be cured or just die. 
 Jay T. Dolmage, in his extensive work, Disability Rhetoric (2014), highlights 
eleven myths told continuously through our popular culture about people with disabilities.  
Before focusing on one of these eleven myths, I will briefly outline each to illustrate an 
overall pattern: 
 
(1) Disability as Pathology: Disability is described and defined by 
someone who is not disabled in terms of how significantly and in 
what ways the person deviates from standardized norms. 
 
(2) Kill-or-Cure: In works of fiction, a prominent disabled 




(3) Overcoming or Compensation: The person with disabilities has 
a special talent which, as Dolmage puts it, “offsets their 
deficiencies” (2014, p. 35). 
 
(4) Disability as Object of Pity and/or Charity: A disabled 
character is presented as a sad, impotent problem, one which can 
be solved through charity. 
 
(5) Physical Deformity as Sign of Internal Flaw: Through 
descriptions of bodily difference which accentuate its “foreignness, 
abnormality, or exoticness,” (Dolmage, 2014, p. 35) insinuations 
about internal deformity, such as of character or mental health are 
made. 
 
(6) Disability as Isolating and Individuated: The disability 
overwhelms the person’s life, causing an isolation which can be 
viewed as the natural consequence of disability. 
 
(7) Disability as Sign of Social Ill: People with disabilities 
represent the deep social failings of their society. 
 
(8) Disability Is a Sign from Above: Disability is caused by sacred 




(9) Disability as Symptom of Human Abuse of Nature: Living out 
of harmony with nature, at best, and defiling it, at worse, causes 
disability or is represented in fiction by disability in defiling 
characters. 
 
(10) Disability Drift and the Disability Hierarchy: People with 
physical disabilities are perceived as having mental or cognitive 
disabilities and vice versa. 
 
(11) Disability Drop: In a work of fiction, this myth plays out 
when a character is shown to have been “faking” their disabilities.  
(Dolmage, 2014, pp. 34-47) 
 
 These myths, which pervade cultures in religious rituals and proclamations about 
the will of God to entertainment and policy-making, are deeply negative.  Some of these 
myths blame society or its deviation from God’s will; several of these myths blame the 
person who has a disability, whether by making it her fault or by insinuating that the 
disability is being faked; and all of these myths emphasize the idea that disability is 
deeply, powerfully, even lethally undesirable.  The “kill-or-cure” myth is perhaps the 
most severe example of this: It is better to die than to live if your disability cannot be 
corrected. 
 The philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche is notorious for his strong and callous 




minority or majority.  I include the below passage from Nietzsche to illustrate the 
sentiments of some, and the underlying perceptions and cultural-historical ideas which 
may be influencing others.  This passage is from Twilight of the Idols, and Nietzsche 
states that he is offering “[a] moral code for physicians.” 
 
The invalid is a parasite on society.  In a certain state it is indecent 
to go on living.  To vegetate on in cowardly dependence on 
physicians and medicaments after the meaning of life, the right to 
life, has been lost ought to entail the profound contempt of society.  
Physicians, in their turn, ought to be the communicators of this 
contempt—not prescriptions, but every day a fresh dose of disgust 
with their patients….To die proudly when it is no longer possible 
to live proudly.  Death of one’s own free choice, death at the 
proper time, with a clear head and with joyfulness, consummated 
in the midst of children and witnesses: so that an actual leave-
taking is possible which he who is leaving is still there….We have 
no power to prevent ourselves being born: but we can rectify this 
effort—for sometimes it is an error.”  (Nietzsche, 1990, pp. 99-100) 
 
 All of these myths and ideas interplay to create a culture which has negative 
stereotypes of people with disabilities and becoming a person with a disability which are 
likely to influence someone who is faced with disability in themselves or others.  The 




proudly when life is an error into a potentially devastating reality.  As a subculture faced 
with this kill-or-cure myth, it becomes quite understandable why the vast majority of 
disability activists would oppose medical euthanasia when those being euthanized are 
almost exclusively defined by their groups as people with disabilities.  The picture which 
emerges is this one: Because the patient in question cannot be cured of a loathsome 
condition which robs of dignity and any purpose at all, she should be killed. 
 
5.1.1.2 Contested Reality: The Threat of the Super-Abled World 
As an able-bodied person, many may find this perception of society’s threat difficult to 
imagine.  As a way of breaking down imaginative barriers for the able-bodied reader, I 
will present a thought experiment which I call, “The Threat of the Super-Abled World.” 
 Imagine that you are living in a world where nearly everyone else has super 
powers.  They are super-abled.  They can fly, have enhanced strength which makes it 
child’s play to lift two-ton slabs of concrete, recycle nutrients within their bodies which 
means they have no need for expelling wastes, and can hold their breath for long journeys 
under water or at extreme altitudes.  Because everyone, just about, has these abilities, all 
of society is based around them.  People fly to work, lifting off of the ground seemingly 
effortlessly and navigating flight traffic into great cities which reach impossibly high into 
the sky.  Construction workers lift great weight with a single finger.  Doors are heavy 
with beautiful metal and stone embellishments.  No one struggles to carry their over-




flight corridors.  Travel is fast, efficient, and downright cheap.  All the super-abled need 
is a thicker coat to manage the chill of rushing through the air. 
 Now, every so often someone is born with a strange condition where these 
abilities are absent.  These people become an instant burden to the society since they are 
unable to engage with society in the ways in which society was built to be engaged.  They 
have to ask a super-abled friend or family member to fly them to work.  They must go out 
of their way to try to find scarce stairways or elevators in skyscrapers where everyone 
else zooms up.  It may take them three times as long, or more, to reach a higher floor 
because of these delays.  Some buildings don’t offer stairways or elevators at all, or 
they’re placed in strange places that are difficult to get to if you cannot fly.  The 
architects seem to be super-abled, too, and even their attempts at meeting your needs 
often fail to consider the breadth of your limitations.  In the elevators, buttons are placed 
too high or take too much force to engage.   
 But worse than transportation are the horrible indignities of daily life and 
appearance.  Everyone can tell you are not super-abled just by looking at you.  Your 
muscles aren’t properly defined, your skin doesn’t show the telltale refreshment of so 
much good air, and you breathe too much.  It annoys people. 
 You try your best to not talk about the worst part, how you have to find these 
horrible, dirty “restrooms” in which to expel the waste your body can’t recycle.  The 
indignity of this waste expulsion process disgusts the super-abled, and they can’t imagine 
having to live with such a terribly base need.  And, worse, someone has to design, clean, 
and maintain these restrooms.  You are spreading your indignity around, becoming an 




 The super-abled wonder why you would want to live like you are.  They talk 
about how if they ever endured one of those rare accidents that could turn a super-abled 
person into someone like you, they would hope it kills them instead.  They understand if 
you want to die, and some of them secretly, or not-so-secretly, wish you just would die so 
that you would stop forcing them to make accommodations for you. Your loved ones get 
tired sometimes, and wish there were some way you needed less.  Some of them start to 
think you like the attention of getting carted around or probably could fly if you would 
just do your exercises.  Your insurance company will not pay for devices to help your 
mobility or make it easier for you to carry heavy things.  These are expensive.  You are 
expensive.  It’s unreasonable. 
 People have been advancing legislation to allow the super-abled who endure 
accidents causing them to lose one or all of their abilities to receive help killing 
themselves painlessly and with loving support.  As these policies advance, more and 
more people begin to advocate for the idea that you—a born dis/regularly abled person—
should take advantage of them.  Your life is a painful and horrible accident.  It’s 
understandable and okay if you want help to die.  You are supported.  Your insurance 
company tells you that they will not pay for a treatment that could help you levitate and, 
therefore, achieve some increased mobility, but they will pay for the lethal drug which is 
now legal for doctors to prescribe to you.  Your insistence on trying to live is becoming 
burdensome in itself. 
 On a daily basis, you are faced with people who won’t look at you because you 
make them uncomfortable, who leave the room or fall silent when you enter, and people 




assume you have cognitive impairments.  When you get angry about how you are treated, 
people seem uncomfortable, and they don’t listen.  Of course you are angry, they think.  
You have a disability no one would want.  Your life is a terrible, sad, and undignified 
thing. 
 You have a small circle of friends who do not have super abilities either.  Two 
weeks ago, one of them decided her doctor and brother were right; she decided to consent 
to a dignified death rather than continuing on in her miserable indignities.  You wanted to 
beg her to reconsider, but she wouldn’t respond to your texts or phone calls.  You knew 
she had felt lonely for years because her family would go on flying trips in the Rocky 
Mountains and the Alps without her, her coworkers never invited her to their parties, and 
her boyfriend of five years had angrily flown off, fed up for some reason she was sure 
was the burden of her disabilities.  You called her family, trying to tell them you thought 
your friend was depressed and needed help, but they responded that it was understandable 
that she was depressed, because her disabilities were so terrible.  The help she truly 
needed was to be free from the burden of life, they said.  Nothing you could think to say 
changed their minds.  The next time you were at the doctor, you overheard a nurse talking 
to another patient with your condition about the option to die, and he, too, was 
considering it.  When you got into the doctor’s office, the nurse and then the doctor 
talked to you about the option.  The message was becoming very clear: You should die.  
Because you defecate, cannot fly, and need special accommodations, you should die. 
 In this thought experiment, the legalization of medical euthanasia puts this special 
class of people, those without super powers, at great risk because society does not 




but nearby world, society resists providing the accommodations regularly-abled people 
need.  This thought experiment is meant to provide an imaginative window into the 
perceived reality of the disability rights activist—a window, if one is needed, into the 
idea that opposition to medical euthanasia is the result of a deep threat to the lives of the 
disabled from a culture which devalues them.  Once we are in this position and see the 
world from this point of view, we may see more easily why it is difficult for disability 
rights activists to engage with, or even respect, the pro-medical euthanasia perspectives 
of groups like Compassion & Choices, groups which are actively disregarding the lethal 
danger to people with disabilities and the active devaluing of their very existence by the 
legalizing of a death one is expected to prefer over life. 
 At this point, a reader may feel compelled to argue with these claims or support 
them.  However, the purpose of applying imaginative resistance is not to convince us of 
the correctness or moral truth of a perspective but rather to help us understand the 
worldview from which a person or group is approaching a debate.  From this 
understanding, each side can engage more effectively.  Whether we agree or not is not the 
issue when applying imaginative resistance, except when working to understand the 
biases we may bring to an analysis. 
 From the point of view I just outlined, then, it is easy to see why discussion of 
“death with dignity” by Compassion & Choices can seem a perversion of the concept of 
dignity.  In the super-abled world, it is considered an indignity to have to use a bathroom 
to expel waste, just as in the real world the need for an assistant or special facilities in 
order to use the bathroom is considered an indignity by regularly-abled people.  But, in 




say that that person’s life lacks basic dignity and worth is, regularly-abled people will 
want to say, perverse.  This appears to be the valuing of a personal fear, or, at best, a 
personal preference, over the lives of regularly-abled people.   Therefore, in the super-
abled world, it looks to the regularly-abled as though the super-abled consider personal 
dignity to be more important than basic dignity.  And this perceived emphasis of personal 
dignity and complete disregard for basic dignity is simply appalling, even evil.  The 
parallel with members of Not Dead Yet in the real world is obvious.  To Not Dead Yet, it 
looks as though most of society employs a value system in which personal dignity is 
more important than basic dignity, in which personal preference is valued more than the 
basic respect for all people and their existence.  This perception colors Not Dead Yet’s 
understanding of every kind of rhetoric that comes out of the larger society.  
 On the other side, Compassion & Choices likely does not understand the depths of 
these concerns or the experiences they stem from; their worldview does not leave room 
for Not Dead Yet’s arguments and leaves them ignoring those arguments as irrational or 
even oppressive of those who are suffering. 
 To reiterate, the point of this thought experiment is to enable readers who are not 
initially sympathetic to the concerns of Not Dead Yet to see the world as Not Dead Yet 
sees it.  Once we accustom ourselves to the point of view of Not Dead Yet—that is to say, 
accustom ourselves to their worldview and perceived reality—it becomes hard to 
understand how anyone could deny that what is infinitely valuable appears to be being 
devalued and dismissed by the other side (again, whether or not it actually is being 
devalued and dismissed or not is not the issue), which may be having serious 




Compassion & Choices’ worldview.  Through these analyses, we are able to do 
something that is normally very hard to do: step into each side’s worldview and see how, 
from here, the point of view of the other side is difficult to imagine and, thus, understand.  
More specifically, from within one worldview, the value system that sustains the 
arguments and opinions of the other worldview is very difficult to “hold in mind” for any 
length of time.  This is the problem created by contested realities. 
 
5.1.1.2.1 Contagion 
From the perspective of Not Dead Yet, we can now see that those within Not Dead Yet 
may experience imaginative resistance to arguments, claims, and even terms posited by 
groups like Compassion & Choices.  To even be willing to imagine arguments from the 
perspective of Compassion & Choices may seem like a dangerous betrayal of one’s own 
community, one which, worse, could result in a deviation from the message would could 
weaken the cause.  On the other side, Compassion & Choices may be experiencing a 
similar fear of contagion.  If either side dares to imagine the experience of the other, they 
may feel compelled to change their mission.  As we have seen through “The Threat of the 
Super-Abled World,” if one tries to imagine the world from the perspective of someone 
whose cause may threaten your own, you may be tempted to sympathize with their cause.  
Gendler’s contagion hypothesis makes it clear why some would be concerned with even 
trying to engage with this narrative reality.  While understanding your opponents may be 
essential to effective debate, perhaps imagining the perspectives of your opponent is also 




5.1.1.2.2 Understanding and Traversing Contested Reality 
By understanding the worldview and perceived reality of those on each side of this debate, 
each side (and those outside the debate) may be able to eventually actively and 
effectively discuss their concerns with the other.  By understanding that imaginative 
resistance creates barriers to this understanding which are unique, such as the deeply felt 
and sometimes reflexive fear of contagion, those outside of the debate can more carefully 
work with those within it to find common ground, if this is their wish. 
 When polarization occurs, each side no longer listens to the other, and reasonable, 
even necessary, concerns are not heard.  In the case of a less powerful group, such as Not 
Dead Yet, this polarizing effect sharply reduces their ability to affect policy in ways 
which may provide some of the safeguards they want in place to protect people with 
disabilities from the dangerous myths of a society which devalues them.  Compassion & 
Choices, by opening up a reasonable dialogue with disability rights groups, could use 
their power to make sure that safeguards are in place while new laws are being formed.  
But if neither group understands the worldview through which the other is operating, 
neither can engage with their opponent in meaningful, constructive ways.  It becomes a 
battle between whoever can make the sharpest, boldest moves which are received the best 
by those who will make the decisions.  Battle may be common in our system, but it is, 








CHAPTER 6. APPLICATION TO FUTURE COMMUNICATION RESEARCH 
6.1 Understanding in Polarization 
Imaginative resistance, as I have discussed and applied in previous chapters, allows us to 
directly assess the worldview and perceived reality beneath the polarized rhetoric in an 
array of policy, organizational, and interpersonal debates.  By combining a close reading 
of a variety of texts from each side while simultaneously seeking further research into 
each side’s worldview and then moving from worldview to text rather than from text to 
worldview, the understanding Richards implored us to seek becomes locatable in even 
the angriest—and least apparently rational—of debates. 
 Given statistics that show that polarization is increasing in the United States, and 
the possible political, economic, social, and interpersonal consequences of this, there are 
likely a vast array of debates and perspectives within those debates which could be 
analyzed using imaginative resistance.  In the medical euthanasia debate, alone, there are 
multiple additional sides to analyze, including that of Compassion & Choices, broader 
progressive groups, and conservative perspectives, to name just a few.  Other political 
debates, such as debates about the death penalty, racial profiling, abortion, health care, 
and the best economic recovery policies are just a few examples. 
 Some issues of polarization are potentially deadly, and seeking to understand 




combat dangerous worldviews and perceived realities.  Simply arguing against these 
perspectives from an outsider’s perspective with all reasonably due condemnation is 
likely to increase, rather than help to mitigate, polarization and entrenchment.  Examples 
of this kind of polarization include extremist religious groups, political groups, and 
advocacy groups which advocate, or engage in, discrimination, violence, or terrorism. 
 
6.1.1 A Brief Example of Dangerous Polarization 
Recently, Elliot Rodgers went on a shooting spree in California.  On May 23rd, 2014, 
Rodgers drove through several areas of Santa Barbara, California and shot at people he 
encountered.  He killed six and injured thirteen, in what has often been referred to as a 
“massacre” (Rosenberg, May 27, 2014).  While shootings have become commonplace in 
the United States, what is unusual about this case is that Rodgers left behind a detailed 
manifesto and a chilling video (Rosenberg, May 27, 2014; Garvey, 2014; ytwrecords, 
2014).  This video made dramatic assertions about reality which have led some to call 
him “crazy” or “sociopathic.”  Others have pointed out that Rodgers was connected to 
certain Men’s Rights groups which engage with a narrative reality vastly different than 
that of most people in our society. 
 Rodgers’ video of his motives before the shooting reveal aspects of this narrative 
reality (ytwrecords, 2014).  He claims that he has been consistently rejected sexually by 
women, that women have “denied” him a happy life, and that due to this, they “deserve to 
be annihilated” (ytwrecords, 2014).  He also claims that men who have been sexually 
active with women have committed a crime, the “crime of living a better life” than him 




women because they should prefer him, a “supreme gentleman” to other men whom he 
describes as “obnoxious” (ytwrecords, 2014).  Rodgers claims that by rejecting him, 
women “forced [him] to suffer all [his] life” (ytwrecords, 2014; Garvey, 2014). 
 Many people had a strong reaction to his assertions.  Some supported his claims, 
but most rejected them in whole or in part as being a dangerously discriminatory 
worldview entrenched in dangerous narratives.  Perhaps it is very good that the majority 
of people who disagree with Rodgers were often unwilling to engage with his narratives, 
but what about Rodgers and others in the Men’s Rights Movement being unwilling or 
unable to engage with healthier, less violent, and less discriminatory narratives?  If no 
one seeks to understand the worldview of this movement and its more extreme members 
and people instead simply label these extremists as “crazy,” then it is difficult to 
understand their motives or concerns, and, therefore, to know how to try to address these 
issues in ways which will have an impact on the number of men who join their informal, 
or formal, ranks. 
 
6.1.1.1 Methods and Broad Applications 
How can we understand polarized viewpoints?  Imaginative resistance allows us to 
entertain the idea that the people on both sides are operating from incompatible narratives 





(I) How do we engage with each party in such a way as to not 
evoke imaginative resistance in order to engage in open-minded 
debate or seek solutions to polarization-related problems? 
 
(II) Understanding that each party comes from its pinpointed 
reality, how can we adjust the way we speak and think about their 
arguments in order to engage with them—or those around them—
more directly, respectfully, and effectively? 
 
(III) Are there levels of concern over moral contagion which may 
create additional barriers, and, if so, in what ways may we need to 
approach these barriers? 
 
 I believe that the answer comes in the second of the two factors I have laid out as 
being essential to forms of imaginative resistance.  The first is that the act is a value 
offense.  The second is that the act is a communicative offense.  Often, just by framing 
our values within our own narrative structures, we instigate conflict.  We have committed 
a communication offense by telling the other person: “I exist in another world, the only 
world that should be considered.  Engage on my terms or don’t engage.” 
 I have presented cases above where imaginative resistance can be useful in 
addressing narratives in social movements as well as organizationally or culturally based 
narratives as they are expressed in interpersonal communication.  I believe that this study 




If we can assess what, precisely, causes imaginative resistance, we can begin to counter 
the trends of polarization that grow more deeply entrenched each time someone commits 
a value and communicative offense, thereby intensifying resistance. 
 
6.1.1.1.1 Incommensurability 
The theory of imaginative resistance, as I present it and discuss its value in the field of 
communication, shares some theoretical and practical features with the concept of 
incommensurability.  In Paradigms and Barriers (1993), Howard Margolis discusses a 
“puzzle” of his own, and introduces incommensurability in a way which clearly shares 
key elements with imaginative resistance: 
 
[W]ith respect to habits of mind, situations must arise which 
intuitions conflict, and we cannot see easily or at all why they 
conflict.  In addition, neither side sees any reason to try to see 
things as their adversaries do: rather, the puzzle for them lies in 
why their adversaries cannot see how weak their case 
is….Arguments that seem powerful to one side seem unimportant 
to the other.  What looks like striking insight to one side looks like 
perverse illusion to the other. (p. 20) 
 
 Margolis is describing a phenomenon that he, and others, call incommensurability 




common standard for taking the measure of two systems with respect to each other” 
(Harris, 2005, p. 3).  When applied to rhetoric, incommensurability is regarded as a 
serious issue of miscommunication between parties which, when present, “argument fails” 
(Harris, June 3, 2012, p. 1).  The debate over the usage of the term incommensurability as 
well as its parameters and implications are complex and evolving, but the theory has clear 
parallels with the theory of imaginative resistance as I outline it here.  
Incommensurability discusses what is likely an often overlapping type of 
miscommunication as the type highlighted in imaginative resistance, one which is 
similarly rooted in incompatibility, whether in worldview, argument, or assumption.  
When two ideas conflict and both cannot be true, conflict occurs. 
 Imaginative resistance helps to both narrow and broaden the applications of 
incommensurability to focus on polarization and the incompatibility of worldviews, and 
further, offers the insight that fears of moral contagion are central to the issue of why 
parties may be refusing to engage, even if it is in their best interests to do so.  
Incommensurability also offers new insights which can be considered alongside and 
within the theory of imaginative resistance, such as the idea that there may be strong and 
weak incommensurability and the consequences thereof (Harris, 2005; June 3, 2012).  
Considering these theories together would likely provide valuable insights into both. 
 
6.1.1.1.2 Conclusions 
Polarization is a growing problem in the United States.  To address this problem, we 




insights into aspects of existing theory.  Imaginative resistance can be applied to debates, 
discussions, and disagreements of a wide variety which are rooted in deeply held beliefs 
which differ significantly in their core narratives, assumptions, and conceptions of reality.  
The value and insights this theory can provide have been explored through the analysis of 
Not Dead Yet’s perspectives in the medical euthanasia debate.  I have noted and briefly 
discussed several other debates for which this theory is likely to provide important 
insights.  Understanding the contested realities of parties involved should be explored in 
order to devise strategies to bridge these gaps and help to establish dialogue as well as 
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